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Unclassified 
Competition Policy for Labour Markets 
By Herbert Hovenkamp* 
1. Antitrust law in many jurisdictions defines its consumer welfare goal in terms of 
low consumer prices. For example, mergers are challenged when they threaten to cause a 
price increase from reduced competition in the post-merger market.1 While the consumer 
welfare principle is under attack in some circles,2 it remains the most widely expressed goal 
of antitrust policy in the United States. 
2. We would do better, however, to define the consumer welfare principle in terms of 
output rather than price. Competition policy should strive to facilitate the highest output in 
any market that is consistent with sustainable competition.3 That goal is in most ways the 
same as a goal of pursuing lower consumer prices; that is, as output goes up prices go down. 
But thinking of consumer welfare in terms of output has other notable advantages. For 
example, while competitive firms do not control the market price, unless they are in cartels, 
each firm does control its own output. 
3. Further, focusing entirely on price makes it awkward to work the supply side of 
markets into debates about consumer welfare.  Labour markets are a notable example.  
Labour appears in the market as suppliers, not as purchasers. While consumers-as-
consumers benefit from lower prices, combatting restraints in labour markets generally 
focuses on wage suppression. That is, today the principal problem of competition policy in 
labour markets is wages that are too low, not those that are too high.4 In some minds that 
creates an antinomy: restraints lead to higher prices on the consumer side of the market. 
Unrestrained labour markets lead to higher wages, which in turn lead to higher prices. By 
the same token, labour cartels, including some of the activities of labour unions, tend to 
raise the costs of labour and may have an upward effect on product prices. 
4. But product consumers and labourers have one thing in common: just as consumers 
benefit from high output because it produces lower prices in product markets, so too labour 
benefits from high output because it increases the demand for jobs and, in the process, 
boosts wages. All other things including technology being unchanged, higher output 
requires more labour. Under perfect competition on both sides of the market, each worker 
                                                     
* James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law and the Wharton 
School. 
1 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
(Aug. 19, 2010), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 
(repeatedly expressing concern for higher prices resulting from mergers. 
2See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, __ J. Corp. L. ___ 
(2020) (forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3197329. 
3 Under robust competition a firm sets its price at or near marginal cost, just recovering a reasonable 
return on its fixed and variable costs.  This output level is minimally sufficient to sustain a firm 
while giving it a competitive rate of return. 
4 For a brief discussion of the problem of excessive wages see discussion infra concerning the labour 
immunity. 
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receives the marginal value of his or her production. In a very important sense, the fortunes 
of consumers and the fortunes of labour are linked together. 
5. In the United States we have traditionally seen anti-labour policies as coming from 
the political right, through such means as right-to-work laws that drive wages down5 or 
other forms of anti-union activity. But today the competition policy advocated on the left 
has its own share of anti-worker sentiment, particularly in the form of attacks on low prices. 
Higher prices certainly harm consumers, but they also harm labour by reducing output. 
1. Labour Markets: Assessing Power and Competitive Effects 
6. When we speak of a competitive firm, we usually begin by thinking of its position 
in the market in which it sells. But firms can exercise market power on both the buying and 
the selling side of the market. Just as a firm with market power or a cartel restrains trade 
by reducing output and raising price in the product market where it sells, so to it can restrain 
trade by reducing its purchasing in an input market in order to suppress prices, including 
the price of labour.6 Some firms may have sufficient power to do this unilaterally. Others 
might do it by forming a buy-side cartel. In addition, some mergers yield the power to 
suppress wages.7 
7. A particular firm does not necessarily have significant market power on both the 
selling and the buying side at the same time. Similarly, a cartel need not exercise power on 
both sides of its market. Some firms can have significant power on the buying side, but 
very little on the sell side, or vice-versa. Further, the boundaries of a market can differ 
substantially for a firm’s buying and selling sides. A good illustration is the United States 
Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in Mandeville Island Farms, which involved a cartel 
among sugar refining companies suppressing their purchases of sugar beets in order to 
lower input costs. Sugar beets are grown and shipped in small geographic areas because 
they are perishable agricultural products and transportation costs are high in relation to 
value. By contrast, the end product of sugar beet refining – table sugar – can be shipped at 
least nationwide. It need not be refrigerated, and shipping costs are lower in relation to 
value. This particular cartel of sugar beet refiners was limited to the northern part of the 
state of California, where there were only three purchasing refiners buying beets from 
farmers scattered over a small geographic range.8 As the Supreme Court observed, the beets 
subject to the cartel were all located in a small area of California. However, “…the beets 
                                                     
5 See, e.g., Elise Gould and Will Kimball, “Right to Work” States Still Have Lower Wages, 
Economic Policy Institute (Apr 22, 2015), available at https://www.epi.org/publication/right-to-
work-states-have-lower-wages/.  See also Sudheer Chava, Andras Danis, and Alex Hsu, The Impact 
of right-to-Work Laws on Worker Wages: Evidence from Collective Bargaining Agreements (Oct. 
2018), George Tech Scheller college of bus. Res. Paper #18-1, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3088612.  
6See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Monopsony in Law and Economics (2010). 
7 See discussion infra; and see Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers 
in Labour Markets ___ Ind. L.J. __ (2019), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124483 (impact of mergers in labour 
markets). 
8 Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). 
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are converted into sugar and [then] the sugar starts on its interstate journey to the tables 
of the nation…”9 Indeed, the case itself was a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court 
under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, because the explicit restraint covered only the 
sugar beets grown within a single state, but the basis of jurisdiction was the post-production 
shipment of the refined sugar that was shipped nationally.10 
8. The practical effect of the price fixing was that the cartel members produced less 
sugar, but that decrease in output very likely had little effect on the market price or market 
wide output of refined sugar, because the refined product was resold in a competitive 
market that was much larger than the market in which the sugar beets were purchased.11 
9. Labour markets often have similar characteristics. For example, many geographic 
markets for labour are relatively small for the simple reason that workers travel over a 
relatively narrow range.12 By contrast, the geographic markets in which their employers 
sell the product can be much larger, although they are not necessarily so. Each market must 
be calculated individually. Further, firms maximise depending on the amount of power they 
have in a particular market, and those amounts differ on the buying vs. the selling side. 
Importantly, most workers who are already hired commute over a fairly narrow market. By 
contrast, job search distances can be larger, and sometimes much larger, but these are more 
akin to potential entrants rather than incumbent competitors. 
10. This has some important implications for competition policy. First, restraints 
should be assessed in the particular market that is restrained. A good illustration is State of 
California v. eBay, Inc,13 where the court approved an antitrust settlement shutting down a 
cartel involving a “no poaching” agreement between eBay, Inc. and Intuit, Inc., covering 
specialised computer engineers. These two firms are not competitors in the product markets 
in which they sale. Intuit makes business software, including popular consumer programs 
such as Turbotax and Quickbooks. By contrast, eBay is a general purpose online auction 
site that does not manufacture any computer software, although it sells some new and used 
Intuit products as a broker through some of its auction vendors. That is, the firms have 
                                                     
9 334 U.S. at 228. 
10 The decision thus overruled United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), which arose 
under similar facts.  Sugar in that case was refined entirely within New York, but then later shipped 
across state lines.  Briefly, earlier interpretations of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, including E.C. 
Knight, required that the challenged restraint govern transactions that were in commerce and actually 
crossed a state line.  In its decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) the Supreme Court 
expanded Commerce Clause jurisdiction to reach activities that were either in or “affecting” 
interstate commerce.  Mandeville Island Farms was one of the earlier decisions applying this 
extended reach to the Sherman Act.  See 1B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 
¶266 (4th ed 2013).  
11 Another fact that the Court did not mention is that after refining beet sugar is chemically identical 
to cane sugar and the two are widely regarded as distinguishable. 
12 Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labour Markets ___ Ind. 
L.J. __ (2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124483; Ioana 
Marinescu & Roland Rathelot, Mismatch: Unemployment and the Geography of Job Search, 10 Am. 
Econ.J.: Macroeconomics 42 (2018); José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum & Bledi 
Taska, Concentration in US Labour Markets: Evidence From Online Vacancy Data (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24395, 2018). 
13 2014 WL 4273888 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 29, 2014) 
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virtually no competitive relationship in the product market, and a very limited vertical 
relationship through the sale of Intuit products on the eBay auction site. On the product 
side the two firms would not be considered competitors for merger analysis and would very 
likely be unable to profit from product price fixing. 
11. Nevertheless, on the labour side the two firms compete for the same technically 
trained employees and could profit by agreeing to suppress wages. A no-poaching 
agreement for labour is the rough equivalent of a market division agreement in the product 
market. Basically, the firms agreed not to hire away one another’s workers in a given 
specialty. In approving the settlement, the court summarised the allegations: 
eBay's agreement with Intuit eliminated competition for employees, and it harmed 
employees by reducing the salaries, benefits, and employment opportunities they 
might otherwise have earned if competition had not been eliminated. The 
agreement also distorted the competition among employers for skilled employees 
and likely resulted in some of eBay's and Intuit's employees remaining in jobs that 
did not fully use their unique skills. Additionally, the agreement harmed 
California's economy by depriving Silicon Valley of its usual pollinators of ideas, 
hurting the overall competitiveness of the region.14 
12. There was no claim that the no-poaching agreement affected product prices to 
consumers. 
13. Cases such as Mandeville Island Farms illustrate that firms can operate in very 
different geographic markets on the buy and sell sides, and eBay illustrates that they can 
operate in very different product markets as well as geographic markets. Today it seems 
clear that most labour markets are geographically quite small, many of them no larger than 
the commuting range of employees.15 One consequence of this is that labour market 
concentration is in fact quite high, often significantly higher than product market 
concentration.  Often the shipping range of manufactured products is considerably larger 
than the commuting or job search range of actual and prospective employees.16 Further, 
wages are forced down as labour market concentration is higher, just as product margins 
go higher as concentration goes up. 
14. In general, EU law on the subject of competition policy and labour market restraints 
appears to be less well developed than United States law, although some member states 
have been more active. While EU competition law is much more enthusiastic about 
consumer welfare as a competition policy goal, it has tended not to connect this to the 
welfare of workers. While some fret that EU law is inadequately equipped to deal with 
worker welfare, the statutory tools seem to be adequate.17 Further, EU law appears to apply 
                                                     
14 California v. eBay, Inc., 2015 WL 5168666 (N.D.Cal. Sep. 3, 2015). 
15See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra. 
16 See Marinescu & Rathelot, Mismatch, supra. 
17 E.g., FREDERIK ALBERT HENDRIK VAN DOORN, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF BUYER POWER IN 
EU COMPETITION POLICY §§ 1.4, 4.2 (2015), 
https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/1874/312604/1/Doorn.pdf. 
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to buyer power generally;18 it simply has not been very much brought to bear on power vis-
à-vis workers. 
15. If consumer welfare is measured in terms of output rather than place, then a link 
between consumer welfare and worker welfare is easily seen. In general, the consumer 
welfare principle should encourage maximum output consistent with sustainable 
competition.19 That outcome would produce both lower prices for consumers and greater 
demand for workers. 
2. Restraints on Output in Labour Markets 
16. Nearly the full range of restraints that antitrust law has traditionally condemned in 
product markets can also be actionable in labour markets. These include mergers, collusion 
of various kinds,20 information exchanges,21 and vertical exclusionary restraints analogised 
to exclusive dealing. Measurement problems are sometimes more difficult on the buy side 
of the market, particularly when reductions in purchasing can be explained by either 
increased efficiency or as an exercise of monopsony power. Although fact finding can be 
difficult, welfare standard that focuses on output can appropriately check restraints in the 
labour market that result in lower output and suppressed wages and salaries. Restraints in 
the labour market are anticompetitive when they tend to suppress wages by reducing the 
output of labour. 
2.1. Horizontal Mergers 
17. Analysing the impact of horizontal mergers in labour markets promises to be a large 
growth area in merger enforcement. Proposed amendments to the United States merger 
statute would add a concern for “monopsony” to the monopoly concerns expressed in §7 
of the Clayton Act.22 In fact, however, the provision already reaches monopsony. It simply 
has not been applied to purchasing market power very frequently.23 While both §3 of the 
                                                     
18 E.g. Case No IV/M.784, Kesko/Tuko, 1997 O.J. (L 110) 53, ¶ 136). 
19 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, __ J. Corp. L. __ 
(2020), available at 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2987&context=faculty_scholarship. 
20 One important set of decisions not discussed at any length here are restraints, including wage and 
salary restrictions, placed on collegiate athletes.  See In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cr Antitrust 
Litigation, 2019 WL 1747780 (N.D.Cal., Nov. 8, 2019) (condemning NCAA restrictions on athletic 
compensation under the rule of reason).  See also OBannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(similar). 
21 E.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (sustaining complaint that petroleum 
companies exchanged information about certain classes of higher paid professional employees, with 
intent of limiting competition). 
22 Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act, S. 1812, 115th Cong. (2017). 
23 See 4A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶980-982 (4th ed. 2016). There 
are a few decisions.  See, e.g., United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 
1965) (granting preliminary injunction against merger alleged to suppress the merging firms’ 
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Clayton Act (tying and exclusive dealing) and Clayton Act §2’s Robinson-Patman price 
discrimination statute apply exclusively to sellers, the merger provision contains no such 
limitation.24 It applies to any merger whose effects may be substantially to lessen 
competition or create a monopoly in any line of commerce, not distinguishing buyer from 
seller effects. 
18. In appropriate cases merger analysis should include an investigation into the 
proposed merger’s impact on the output of labour, and thus on wages. The evidence at this 
time suggests that the correlation between higher labour market concentration and 
downward pressure on wages is a strong or perhaps even stronger than the correlation 
between product market concentration and higher product prices.25 Labour market merger 
analysis may also have an analogue to the rationale for higher market prices from 
“unilateral effects,” although much of that works remains to be done.26 
19. One caution about analysing mergers in labour markets relates to the treatment of 
merger-specific efficiencies. Here is where focusing on output provides a good tool for 
analysis, although measurement problems should not be trivialised. Often mergers provide 
an opportunity for technical consolidation or streamlining that serves to reduce the demand 
for labour even though it increases the firm’s output in the product market. For example, 
when two manufacturing firms that each have well developed dealership networks, such as 
automobile manufacturers, merge, one likely effect will be consolidation of dealerships.  If 
each merger partner had one dealership in a community prior to the merger, the post-merger 
firm might close one of them, combining various services into one. The cost savings that 
result from such streamlining might reduce the demand for labour. But this could be 
consequence of efficient elimination of duplication, not an exercise of monopsony power. 
In that case, such a merger should increase the post-merger firm’s product output to the 
extent that its costs are lower. 
2.2. Horizontal Agreements; Anti-Poaching Clauses 
20. Horizontal agreements involving labour should be subject to the ordinarily 
classification of naked and ancillary restraints.27 Just as antitrust law distinguishes price 
fixing from various joint purchasing and selling activities on the sell side of the market, it 
needs to develop similar distinctions respecting the purchase of labour. For example, 
antitrust policy distinguishes price-fixing from joint bidding. The latter occurs when two 
people bid jointly for an asset that they intend to share or develop jointly. By the same 
token, certain types of employment agencies engage in joint bidding for the purchase of 
                                                     
purchases of crude oil after finding that the geographic market in which the firms purchased was 
much smaller than the one in which they sold). 
24See 15 U.S.C. §14 (tying and exclusive dealing, making it unlawful “to lease or make a sale….”); 
15 U.S.C. §13 (applying to price discrimination “between different purchasers”). 
25See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note. 
26For a brief discussion, see Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for 
Labour Market Power, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 536, 578- 583 (2018). 
27 It appears that EU law has not yet addressed the issue. 
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labour services.28  United States antitrust law has begun to address naked no poaching 
agreements, finding most of them to be unlawful per se. EU law is somewhat less 
developed.29 A few cases have considered and upheld agreements attending a merger that 
for a relatively short term forbad the seller of a business from poaching off of that 
business’s employees.30 But these are best treated as ancillary restraints attending the sale 
of a business, which are ordinarily valid if they reach no further than necessary to protect 
the buyer’s investment. 
21. In markets for selling products and services, price information exchanges have been 
litigated many times because of the threat that they will facilitate collusion.31 By the same 
token, some employers might wish to exchange wage and salary information as a device 
for suppressing wages and these can be found unlawful, if their purpose or effect is to soften 
competition in wages or salaries.32 
22. Anti-poaching agreements among two or more competitors are increasingly 
common and just as dangerous to competition as product price fixing. No-poaching 
agreements among independent firms are analogous to market division, which, if naked, is 
unlawful per se. The equivalent would be if two firms agreed not to attempt to steal away 
each other’s established customers.  If two independent firms agree not to hire one another’s 
employees, the agreement should be unlawful because it limits the ability of workers to 
take advantage of mobility in order to bargain for higher wages. 
                                                     
28 E.g., All Care Nursing Servs. v. High Tech Staffing Servs., 135 F.3d 740 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999) (joint purchasing of nursing services).  Cf. Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 720 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff’d mem., 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991) (approving joint purchasing of bottles from a common facility where 
joint purchasing enabled scale economies in bottle production). 
29 See Dr. Petra Linsmeier & Dr. Cathrin Mächtle, Non-poaching and Antitrust Law, 37 EUR. 
COMPETITION L. REV. 145, 146 (2016) (noting that as of that writing EU competition law has not 
addressed the issue).  See also Jean-Nicolas Maillard & Chiara Conte, New Year’s Resolution for 
EU Antitrust Compliance Teams: Putting HR on My Radar Screen, STEPTOE ANTITRUST & 
COMPETITION BLOG (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.steptoeantitrustblog.com/2019/01/new-year-
resolution-eu-antitrust-compliance-teams-putting-hr-practices-radar-screen/. See also “War for 
Talents” in the Crosshairs of Competition Authorities, NOERR (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.noerr.com/en/newsroom/News/war-for-talents-in-the-crosshairs-of-competition-
authorities.aspx  (“In the past on European level, no-poaching agreements were either reviewed as 
ancillary restraints to transactions or were occasionally examined in cartel proceedings along with 
other competition law infringements. In any case, there has been no decision by the European 
Commission dealing exclusively with no-poaching agreements.”).  There are, however, some cases 
in the national courts.  See, e.g. Abwerbeverbot, BGH, I ZR 245/12, BGHZ 201, 205–216) 
(Germany).  Some other decisions are discussed in Dr. Petra Linsmeier & Dr. Cathrin Mächtle, Non-
poaching and Antitrust Law, 37 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 145, 146 (2016). 
30 E.g., Case No IV/M.2386, MEI/Phillips, 2001 O.J. (C 332) 22, ¶¶ 1-2, 17; Case No IV/M.1482, 
Kingfisher/Großlabour, ¶ 1, 24 (April 12, 1999), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers 
/cases/decisions/m1482_en.pdf; Case No IV/M. 1167, ICI/Williams, ¶ 1 (Apr. 29, 1998), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1167_en.pdf.  
31 See 12 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶2111-2114 (4th ed. 2019) (in press). 
32 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) 
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23. To be sure, firms may have an interest in protecting investment in employee 
education or some intellectual property rights such as trade secrets, which could be 
transported by a switching employee to another firm. However, employers do not need 
agreements with each other in order to achieve these results. It is in each individual 
employer’s best interest to protect itself from improper theft of its own employees.  As a 
result, a purely vertical noncompetition agreement should be sufficient for this purpose. 
2.3. Purely Vertical Noncompetition Agreements  
24. We speak of an arrangement as “purely” vertical when there is only one person on 
each side.  That is, the agreement has no horizontal element. Of course, an employer may 
have a large number of identical agreements with its numerous employees, and then we 
must consider whether these employees can be said to be in agreement with each other.  In 
the product market, the closest analogue to a vertical noncompetition agreement is 
exclusive dealing, although there are some differences. For example, exclusive dealing 
typically prevents a dealer or intermediary from dealing in the goods of multiple suppliers 
at the same time.  For example, a dealer in Ford automobiles might be prohibited from 
selling new Toyotas or BMWs out of the same facility. One can imagine an agreement with 
an employee forbidding that employee from working for a competitor at the same time.  In 
fact, however, labour non-compete agreements generally apply to sequential rather than 
simultaneous employment. That is, a worker may be forbidden by the agreement from 
terminating its employment with one firm and then going to work for a rival, often for a 
period of several months or even years. 
25. Under United States antitrust law purely vertical agreements are treated under the 
rule of reason.33 EU law is, if anything, even more benign than United States law.34 That 
treatment has been justified with the explanation that a trained employee or one who has 
access to trade secrets or other confidential information may be in a position to harm a 
former employer or free ride on employer-provided training by taking it elsewhere.35 
26. Nevertheless, that leaves the question of what to do when an employer imposes 
noncompetition agreements on employees who have none of these characteristics. It does 
not seem unreasonable to require an employer claiming free riding of this sort as a defense 
                                                     
33 Nynex Corp. vs. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998).   An arguable exception remains for some 
tying arrangements.  See 9 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶1720 (4th ed. 
2018). 
34 For more detailed information about how individual jurisdictions treat restrictive covenants in 
Europe, see Guide to Employee Non-Compete Agreements in Europe, Middle East and Africa, 
MERITAS (2017), https://www.fcblegal.com/xms/files/Meritas_Guide_to_Employee_Non-
Compete_Agreements_in_EMEA_2017.pdf.  See also A comparison of Laws in Selected EU 
Jurisdictions Relating to Post-Contractual, Non-Competition Agreements Between Employers and 
Employees, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (August 2017), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/ 
en/knowledge/publications/9807eea3/a-comparison-of-laws-in-selected-eu-jurisdictions-relating-
to-post-contractual-non-competition-agreements-between-employers-and-employees. 
35See, e.g., Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151 (Nev. 2016) (acknowledging free 
rider justification for employee non-compete agreement but striking down challenged agreement as 
excessive); Delaware Elevator, Inc. . Williams, 2011 WL 1005181 (Del. Chanc. March 16, 2011); 
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Powers, 2012 WL 6726538 (W.D.Wash. Dec. 27, 2012) (partially enforcing 
employee non-compete agreement). 
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to point to precisely the skills or proprietary information that an employee might have that 
justifies such a substantial restriction. For example, an employer who imposes a 
noncompetition agreement on a low level unskilled employee who has no training or 
protectable secret to share seems excessive. At the very least this requires a hard look at 
the employment market. The problem is much more severe when the agreement includes a 
horizontal element, including agreements that apply to several individually owned 
franchisees of a common franchisor. 
2.4. Intra-Franchise Agreements  
27. For completely independent firms to agree with each other to restrain employee 
mobility among themselves is and should be unlawful in most cases. Intra-franchise no-
poaching agreements are more complex, however, because they have some of the 
characteristics of both vertical and horizontal restraints.36 In a franchise system a single 
franchisor, or upstream party, enters into contractual agreements with numerous local 
franchisees to distribute the franchisor’s product and also take advantage of the franchisor’s 
branding and other intellectual property. Economically, a franchise can achieve most of the 
production efficiencies of a single firm, even though the franchise is organised as a 
contractual relationship among multiple firms rather than as a single entity.37 Historically 
there was some ambiguity about whether the various franchisees and franchisor in such an 
arrangement should be regarded as a single entity lacking conspiratorial capacity for 
purposes of the Sherman Act, and thus subject only to §2’s prohibitions for unilateral 
conduct.38 In the United States, that question has been settled by the Supreme Court’s 
American Needle decision, which found conspiratorial capacity between the NFL and its 
individual team franchises. These individual teams were separately owned and had 
                                                     
36 In Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 794 F.Supp. 1026 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d, 999 F.2d 445 (9 th 
Cir. 1993) the court found that a franchisor and its franchisee were a single entity who could not 
conspire, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on that basis.  That conclusion is incorrect in light of 
American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).  In any event, the no hire clause was apparently 
limited to managers that received significant training by each franchisee.  The court then justified 
the restraint because they “prevent the franchises from ‘raiding’ one another’s [] employees after 
time and expense have been incurred in training them.  794 F.Supp. at 1029. 
37See Paul H. Rubin, the Theory of the firm and the Structure of the franchise Contract, 21 J. L. & 
Econ. 223 (1978).  Cf. Ronald H. Coase, Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937). 
38 E.g., Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 794 F.Supp. 1026 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d, 999 F.2d 445 (9 th 
Cir. 1993) (concluding that franchisor and franchisee were single entity who lacked conspiratorial 
capacity).  See Barry M. Block & Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiracies in Franchise Systems 
After American Needle, 30 Franchise L.J. 216 (2011).  For further economic criticism of Fischer, 
see Benjamin Klein, Single Entity Analysis of Joint Ventures After American Needle, 78 Antitrust 
L.J. 669, 678-679 (2013): 
This rejection of contractual control as a basis for single entity treatment by the Supreme Court is 
fully consistent with the economics of the firm, which makes a similar fundamental distinction 
between control achieved through ownership and control achieved through a contractual 
arrangement. No matter how extensive a franchisor's contractual control may be 
over franchisee conduct, the contractual relationship between a franchisor and its franchisees is 
considered in economics to be an agreement between two separate firms, and not to involve a single 
integrated firm. 
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contractual arrangements with the NFL, but their activities were tightly controlled.39 While 
franchise systems have some of the attributes of a single firm they also have distinct 
management and profit centers. Under American Needle some of a franchisor’s decisions, 
such as the location of a corporate headquarters, belong to the firm as a single entity, but 
decisions that pertain to the operation of the franchisees individually are to be regarded as 
collaborative rather than unilateral. Employee movement among franchisees belongs in the 
latter category. 
28. As contract partners rather than wholly owned subsidiaries of a common owner, 
the individual franchisees may have different interests than those of a similarly structured 
unitary firm. The story here is quite similar to the story of resale price maintenance or other 
vertical intrabrand restraints imposed upon dealers authorised to sell the same brand. 
Speaking of RPM, the dealers themselves have an incentive to keep their margins up, 
perhaps by fixing prices. By contrast, the manufacturer is incentivised to maximise its 
output, which is inconsistent with dealer price fixing. As a result, the contract arrangement 
can create conflicts and opportunities for anticompetitive behavior that full common 
ownership does not. 
29. In recent years United States courts have confronted agreements among the 
franchisees of a single franchisor prohibiting the transfer of employees from one franchisee 
to another. For example, McDonald’s, a major fast food franchisor, is involved in antitrust 
litigation attacking a scheme in which each individual franchisee’s agreement contains a 
provision prohibiting that franchisee from hiring away the employees of a different 
franchisee of the same franchisor. The agreements are very broad, not limited to employees 
who have valuable training or trade secrets that could be subject to free riding.40 
30. A related issue governing intra-franchise agreements is whether they should be 
regarded as horizontal or vertical. Formally, the agreements are contained in franchise 
contracts between the franchisor and each individual franchisee, which would appear to 
make them vertical. At the same time, the numerous franchise agreements contain 
substantially identical provisions and, to the extent they involve restraints on movement 
among otherwise competing franchisees, they appear to be horizontal in effect. 
31. In Deslandes v. McDonald’s, the defendants argued that franchise-wide 
noncompetition agreements which applied to a wide variety of employees across 
McDonald’s franchise system should be viewed, not as a horizontal agreement among 
franchisees but rather as a series of vertical agreements between McDonald’s as franchisor 
                                                     
39 American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
40 Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D.Il. June 25, 2018).  The challenged 
clause in the McDonald’s franchise agreement provides: 
Interference With Employment Relations of Others. During the term of this Franchise, Franchisee 
shall not employ or seek to employ any person who is at the time employed by McDonald’s, any of 
its subsidiaries, or by any person who is at the time operating a McDonald’s restaurant or otherwise 
induce, directly or indirectly, such person to leave such employment. This paragraph [ ] shall not be 
violated if such person has left the employ of any of the foregoing parties for a period in excess of 
six (6) months. 
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and each of its individual franchisees.41 The agreement applied even to low skill employees 
and forbad them from going to work for a different McDonald’s restaurant for six months 
after their employment at the previous restaurant terminated. As the court observed, given 
their low wages for most employees this six month period effectively prevented them from 
moving at all. 
32. The issue of inter-franchise transfer of employees exposes an important difference 
between firms and franchises. A single firm that owns multiple plants or stores might 
certainly have a policy governing employee transfers from one plant to another, but 
typically, it would permit or even encourage some of them in order to optimise overall 
productivity. As a result unitary firms do not typically have blanket prohibitions on the 
movement of employees from one plant or store to another.42 As a general matter it is in a 
firm’s best interests to use its employees in the most profitable way, and if an employee is 
valued more at a different location the firm will agree to the move or sometimes even 
reassign an employee to the different location. That observation is simply an example of 
the general proposition that economic actors continuously move their resources from 
positions of lesser value to those of great value. For example, if production of a given 
product is cheaper at one plant than another, the plants’ owner will have an incentive to 
move production to the lower cost plant. By the same token, if an employee promises to 
contribute more to the value of the firm in a different location, the employer will have an 
incentive to move that employee. By contrast, individual franchisees maximise the value 
of their individual locations. This inclines them to be more resistant to inter-firm movement 
that might deprive them of valued workers. 
33. One rationale for employee noncompetes is of course that the employee has 
received significant training or perhaps possess trade secrets or other valuable information.  
As a result, the noncompete agreement controls free riding that might occur when a second 
employer takes advantage of the first employer’s investment in this training. In the case of 
employees at the different locations of a common franchisor, the employee training and 
trade secret rationales for noncompetition agreements are more difficult to defend.  As a 
general matter franchising is developed in order to create a system where all the stores of a 
particular franchisor are more or less the same. As a result, one would not expect to find 
that a particular franchisee of, say, McDonald’s had trade secrets or specialised training 
that was not communicated to all franchisees. Indeed, it would generally be in a franchisor’s 
best interest to have valuable learning communicated across its individual franchisee, just 
as a unitary firm would ordinarily profit from communicating efficiency-enhancing 
information to all of its various plants. This fact alone suggests that broad limitations on 
inter-franchisee transfer of employees be regarded with suspicion. In any event, the usual 
free rider rationales for limiting inter-employee transfer should not be accepted without 
clear proof that they apply in a particular case. The tribunal should also ask whether such 
policies are overly broad in relation to any articulated and provable justifications. 
34. What all of this suggests is that the real initiative for these franchise wide 
agreements covering all types of employees is not the protection of learning at all, but rather 
                                                     
41 See Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, 2017 WL 6379219 (N.D.Ill. 
Dec. 11, 2017).  See also Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D.Il. June 
25, 2018). 
42 See John Lai, Steven S. Lui, and Eric W.K. Tsang, Intrafirm Knowledge Transfer and Employee 
Innovative Behavior: the Role of Total and Balanced Knowledge Flows, 33 J. Prod. Innov. Mgmt. 
90 (2016), available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/jpim.12262. 
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cartel suppression of wages. In this context, a blanket prohibition on inter-franchisee hiring 
seems egregiously excessive and raises significant competitive concerns. 
3. Anticompetitive Occupational Licensing 
35. On topic that needs more empirical study is the effect of excessive occupational 
licensing on the mobility and earnings of some groups of employees. While the issue has 
arisen numerous times in United States antitrust decisions, it came to a head in the Supreme 
Court’s 2015 decision in FTC v. North Carolina Dental Assn.43 A divided Supreme Court 
struck down a rule promulgated by a professional association controlled by dentists that 
declared the service of teeth whitening to be a part of the practice of dentistry, with the 
result that only licensed dentists could engage in it. The case applied U.S. antitrust law’s 
“state action” doctrine, which condemns private restraints unless they are both “authorised” 
by the state itself and adequately “supervised” by a disinterested state agency.44 
36. The basic problem is easily understood. Governments rightfully leave certain 
aspects of control of the so-called learned professions to participants in those professions. 
At a basic level that makes sense because regulation requires knowledge that only the 
trained professionals are likely to have. At the same time, however, it creates significant 
opportunities for anticompetitive overreaching, particularly when associations that have 
quasi-legislative power and are dominated by market participants pass rules that protect 
themselves at the expense of others. For example, the record in the North Carolina Dental 
Association case show numerous complaints from dentists about the lower prices charged 
by non-dentists provision of teeth whitening, mainly dental hygienists and cosmetologists. 
However, it showed no evidence that these providers as a group had more complaints about 
the quality of their service or were more likely to be a public danger. In sum, the dentists 
were protecting themselves as individuals from low prices; they were not protecting their 
profession from people offering deficient treatment. 
37. In the United States this presents mainly a problem of federalism – namely, to what 
extent should the competition-reinforcing norms of federal antitrust law override local rules 
that are often more protectionist, and thus more exclusionary. As a related matter, however, 
these rules often serve to limit both the mobility and the earnings of individuals who are 
capable on the merits but may lack education or certification that is costly or difficult to 
acquire. 
4. Conclusion: Competition Policy, Consumer Welfare and Employees 
38. The consumer welfare principle today identifies low prices as the principal goal of 
antitrust policy. That has not always been the case. In the late 1970’s Robert H. Bork used 
the term “consumer welfare” to describe the sum of producer profits and consumer gains. 
By using this peculiar nomenclature he was able to identify an improvement in “consumer 
welfare” even when consumers themselves were harmed via higher prices, provided that 
                                                     
43 North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).  
44 See generally 1 & 1A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶221-231 (4th ed. 
2013 & Supp.). 
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these losses were offset by producer gains.45 Further, Bork concluded, a relatively small 
gain in productive efficiency would be sufficient to offset even significant consumer losses. 
As a result, even output reducing practices such as price-increasing mergers could be said 
to increase consumer welfare if these practices produced sufficiently large producer gains. 
39. Bork’s approach seriously underestimated the consumer harm that comes from 
anticompetitive practices and also paid inadequate attention to the measurement problems 
assessing the very complex “tradeoff” between higher prices and increase economic 
welfare that his approach entailed. Perhaps coincidentally, the adoption of Bork’s approach 
coincided with ever increasing price-cost margins in the United States, with the attendant 
output reduction and harm to both labour and consumers. To be sure, today’s high margins 
are not purely a consequence of wrong headed antitrust policy, but antitrust must be 
acknowledged as a factor.46 
40. Today’s understanding of consumer welfare looks only at the welfare of consumers 
as consumers. While that is a significant step forward it continues to pose some conceptual 
difficulties. For example, how should we assess the affects on labour or other input 
providers?  While the modern consumer welfare principle favors low prices, antitrust policy 
regarding labour is troubled mainly by wages that are too low. Further, many people 
instinctively relate higher wages to higher consumer prices, although that correlation is 
highly imperfect and often wrong. 
41. One solution to this problem is to define “consumer welfare” in terms of output 
rather than price. On the demand side of the market, lower prices translate into higher 
output. On the supply side, however, an absence of restrictions on supply also lead to higher 
output. Practices such as anti-poaching agreements are harmful because they suppress 
wages by reducing the demand for labour. Speaking more theoretically, in a perfectly 
competitive market each factor on both the demand side and the supply side receives the 
marginal value of its contribution. 
42. Ceteris paribus, both consumers and labour benefit from practices that tend to 
increase output to its maximum sustainable level, which is a level sufficient to ensure 
competitive returns to business without excessive capture of monopoly (monopsony) 
profits on either the buyer or seller side of the market. When “consumer welfare” is defined 
in terms of output it becomes much easier to articulate a defensible competition policy that 
                                                     
45 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
66, 90-97 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: the Welfare Tradeoffs, 
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 21 (1968); and see Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare 
Principle Imperiled, ___ J.Corp.L. ___ (2020), available at file:///C:/Users/hhovenka/Downloads 
/SSRN-id3197329%20(4).pdf. 
46 See ram Shivakumar, The Market Powr of “Superstar” Companies is Growing, 
ChicagoBoothReview (Oct. 26, 2017), available at http://review.chicagobooth.edu/ 
economics/2017/article/market-power-superstar-companies-growing; David Autor, David Dorn, 
Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labour Share and the 
Rise of Superstar Firms (MIT working paper, May 1, 2017), available at 
https://economics.mit.edu/files/12979.  On the European experience, which is in many ways similar, 
see Cyrille Schwellnus, etc al., Labour Share Developments over the Past Two Decades: The Role 
of Technological Progress, Globalisation and “Winner-takes-most” Dynamics (OECD Economics 
Dept. Working Papers, No. 1502, Sep. 2018), available at https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/3eb9f9ed-en.pdf?expires=1556143083&id=id&accname=guest&checksum 
=E7AD7F7BB1E806B0DBACC146FB8450CB 
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does everything that antitrust can properly do to ensure a healthy economy, reflecting both 
the buy and sell sides of market. 
43. But might there be worthwhile policies that deviate from this definition? Perhaps, 
although at least in the United States antitrust law is not the best way to identify or 
effectuate them. For example, should antitrust policy be involved in putting the brakes on 
labour-reducing technologies or distribution innovations to the extent that they reduce the 
demand for jobs? As a substantive matter, I doubt it, but in any event such a policy would 
lie outside of the scope of antitrust law. 
44. By the same token, policies that protect smaller businesses or older technologies 
from larger or lower cost firms are bad for both consumers and labour and thus violate any 
antitrust principle concerned with maintaining competitive output. The current hostility 
toward large platforms exhibits some of this.47 
45. On the one hand, firms like Google, Amazon, and Facebook have grown very large. 
On the other hand, for the most part their prices to consumers are very low or even zero, 
which tends to maximise the output not only of consumers but also of many other firms 
that deal either with or through these companies. 
46. Amazon, which has been the target of antitrust attention in the United States, is a 
good example. Antitrust is an extremely large online retailer of nearly every conceivable 
consumer product except automobiles and a few other very large items. Its prices to 
consumers are very low and consumer satisfaction ratings are high. The story with respect 
to businesses is more complex. One of the largest areas of Amazon’s business is as a broker 
for thousands of smaller sellers. Here, Amazon offers a choice of fulfilment options. It can 
take items from other sellers, keep them in inventory, sell and ship them, take care of 
billing, and remit the price less its commission to the seller. Under another option the seller 
takes care of inventory and shipping and Amazon principally supplies advertising and 
billing assistance. Many of these businesses undoubtedly sell more as a result of Amazon’s 
assistance.48 
47. The question then becomes, what is a wise antitrust policy with respect to Amazon?  
Some proposals seem to me to be distinctly wrong headed. For example, Presidential 
Candidate Elizabeth Warren proposes segregating Amazon’s business of selling its own 
products from its business of acting as a broker for other sellers. Under her proposal, very 
large platform sellers who sell goods for other sellers would be forbidden from selling their 
own goods on the same platform. The apparent thinking behind this proposal is that 
Amazon would have a big competitive advantage over these other smaller firms unless 
Amazon’s own products are segregated from the products offered by competing firms that 
Amazon represents as a broker. 
48. Many of Amazon’s own products that it sells as a house brand, such as Amazon 
Basics, compete with name brand products for which Amazon acts as a buyer-reseller or 
broker.  Many of these products are sold at high margins and Amazon’s entry has served 
chiefly to give Amazon’s customers a lower price alternative. A good example is the 
AmazonBasics brand of household alkaline batteries, which are the types of batteries that 
are used in many consumer electronic products, including cameras, remote controls, or 
                                                     
47 See, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, The Warren Campaign’s Antitrust Proposals, The 
Regulatory Review (Mar. 25, 2019), available at https://www.theregreview.org/2019/03/25/ 
hovenkamp-warren-campaigns-antitrust-proposals/. 
48 Ibid. 
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smoke detectors. The name brand batteries sold on the Amazon website are some of the 
very firms whose high margins have contributed to the monopoly problem. For example, 
Duracell is owned by Berkshire-Hathaway. Three other brands, Rayovac, Eveready, and 
Energizer, are sold by a holding company that is one of the largest producers of household 
batteries in the world. Duracell, the market leader, controls about 45% of the market.  The 
energizer and Rayovac brands, which are owned by the same company, control roughly 
another 40%.49 Recently the AmazonBasics brand of “generic” batteries has had 
remarkable sales growth and accounts for nearly a third of online battery sales.50 
49. As is frequently the case with generic or house brands, Amazon’s sales are eating 
into the value of the large branded manufacturers’ trademarks. 
50. What is missing from candidate Warren’s proposal is any good empirical work on 
how the AmazonBasics and other Amazon house brands are affecting the online markets 
for manufactured goods. To the extent that these house brands target small family owned 
businesses with low profit margins, they may of course cause competitor distress. One 
would predict, however, that Amazon’s target for new entry is branded products that enjoy 
a high margin between manufacturing costs and prices. Those would be the most attractive 
candidates for new entry. That certainly seems to be the case of household batteries.  In this 
case, permitting Amazon to sell its own “generic” batteries in competition with the name 
brand seems to be an unqualified good for consumers. To the extent that lower prices 
stimulate higher output, it is also good for labour. Forcing Amazon’s house brand to be 
segregated from the brand names will almost certainly lead to higher name brand pricing. 
51. For other products the story may be different. For example, a company called Rain 
Design was selling a laptop stand on Amazon for a price of $43.  Amazon then entered with 
its own AmazonBasics brand at about half that price.51 While the Rain Design product had 
at least one patent, Amazon’s product apparently did not infringe it. Some of the literature 
describes this as a form of predatory behavior.52 But assuming that Amazon’s price is not 
predatory, and nothing suggests that it is, the subtext must be that Rain Design was entitled 
to margins of more than 100% on a product that was easy to invent around and for which 
there are many competitive alternatives. 
52. The best antitrust policy for labour markets is one that simultaneously makes 
product markets as competitive as possible by minimising high costs and high markups, 
and that also makes labour markets as competitive as possible by eliminating undue labour 
market concentration and condemning restraints that unreasonably impair labour mobility.  
                                                     
49 See https://www.statista.com/statistics/380309/market-share-of-the-leading-alkaline-battery-
brands-in-the-us/ (2016 figures). 
50 https://clark.com/shopping-retail/amazon-batteries-online-sales/ 
51 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-20/got-a-hot-seller-on-amazon-prepare-for-
e-tailer-to-make-one-too  
52 See, e.g. Olivia Solon and Julia Carrie Wong, Jeff Bezos vs. the World: Why All Companies Fear 
‘Death by Amazon,’ The Guardian, April 18, 2018, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/24/amazon-jeff-bezos-customer-data-industries  
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